AMMA

The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

AMMA focuses on the economic, algorithmic, technical, and practical issues that arise in developing and deploying market mechanisms.

Editor(s): Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University, Rock Center 219, Harvard Business School Boston, MA 02163) and Lirong Xia (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Lally 306, 110 8th Street, Troy, NY 12180)

Publisher: ICST
ISBN: 978-1-63190-075-4

Conference dates: 8th–9th Aug 2015
Location: Chicago, United States

Appeared in EUDL: 2015-08-13

Ordered by title or year

Showing 11–20 of 26 results

Page size: 102550

Strategic Market Choice: Frequent Call Markets vs. Continuous Double Auctions for Fast and Slow Traders
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Elaine Wah, Dylan Hurd, Michael Wellman
Convergence to Price-Taking by Regret-Minimizers in k-Double Auctions
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Rachel Shafer
New Core-Selecting Payment Rules with Better Fairness and Incentive Properties
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Benjamin Lubin, Benedikt Bünz, Sven Seuken
On Asymmetric Reserve Prices
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Maciej Kotowski
Robust Mechanisms for Sponsored Search
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Mohammad Mahdian, Mukund Sundararajan
Experiments as Instruments: Heterogeneous Position Effects in Sponsored Search Auctions
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Matthew Goldman, Justin Rao
The Optimal Sequence of Prices and Auctions
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Hanzhe Zhang
Are you Going to Do That? Contingent-Payment Mechanisms to Improve Coordination
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David Parkes, James Zou
The Power of Weak Incentives
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Hector Lopez Carbajal
College Assignment as a Large Contest
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

AARON Bodoh-Creed, Brent Hickman

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