AMMA

The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

AMMA focuses on the economic, algorithmic, technical, and practical issues that arise in developing and deploying market mechanisms.

Editor(s): Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University, Rock Center 219, Harvard Business School Boston, MA 02163) and Lirong Xia (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Lally 306, 110 8th Street, Troy, NY 12180)

Publisher: ICST
ISBN: 978-1-63190-075-4

Conference dates: 8th–9th Aug 2015
Location: Chicago, United States

Appeared in EUDL: 2015-08-13

Ordered by title or year

Showing 21–26 of 26 results

Page size: 102550

Promoting Diversity of Talents: A Market Design Approach
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Chia-Ling Hsu
A Robust Redesign of High School Match
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Sam Hwang
The Secure Boston Mechanism
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Umut Dur, Robert Hammond, Thayer Morrill
Achieving Trust without Disclosure: Dark Pools and a Role for Secrecy-Preserving Verification (Invited Paper)
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

David Parkes, Christopher Thorpe, Wei Li
The Allocation of Food to Food Banks
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Canice Prendergast
Can “Complex” Market Designs Make it from Theory to Practice? Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Eric Budish

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AMMA

Promoting Diversity of Talents: A Market Design Approach

A Robust Redesign of High School Match

The Secure Boston Mechanism

Achieving Trust without Disclosure: Dark Pools and a Role for Secrecy-Preserving Verification (Invited Paper)

The Allocation of Food to Food Banks

Can “Complex” Market Designs Make it from Theory to Practice? Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton

About EAI

Community

Publish with EAI