The Optimal Sequence of Prices and Auctions

Hanzhe Zhang

The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Research Article

The Optimal Sequence of Prices and Auctions

Cite: BibTeX Plain Text

@INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260557,
    author={Hanzhe Zhang},
    title={The Optimal Sequence of Prices and Auctions},
    proceedings={The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications},
    publisher={ACM},
    proceedings_a={AMMA},
    year={2015},
    month={8},
    keywords={dynamic mechanism design auction versus price buy-it-now},
    doi={10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260557}
}

Hanzhe Zhang
Year: 2015
The Optimal Sequence of Prices and Auctions
AMMA
ICST
DOI: 10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260557

Hanzhe Zhang¹^,*

1: Department of Economics, University of Chicago

*Contact email: hanzhe@uchicago.edu

Abstract

Consider a monopolist seller who must use posted prices and reserve price auctions to sell one unit of an indivisible good while buyers with independent private values arrive over time. Assume an auction costs more to the seller or to the buyers than a posted price. For a wide range of auction cost, the optimal mechanism sequence is a sequence of prices followed by a sequence of auctions. The prices-then-auctions sequence is optimal under various extensions of the basic setting and resembles a buy-it-now selling format on eBay.

Keywords: dynamic mechanism design, auction versus price, buy-it-now

Published: 2015-08-13
Publisher: ACM

: http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260557

The Optimal Sequence of Prices and Auctions

Abstract

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