AMMA

The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

AMMA focuses on the economic, algorithmic, technical, and practical issues that arise in developing and deploying market mechanisms.

Editor(s): Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University, Rock Center 219, Harvard Business School Boston, MA 02163) and Lirong Xia (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Lally 306, 110 8th Street, Troy, NY 12180)

Publisher: ICST
ISBN: 978-1-63190-075-4

Conference dates: 8th–9th Aug 2015
Location: Chicago, United States

Appeared in EUDL: 2015-08-13

Ordered by title or year

Showing 1–10 of 26 results

Page size: 102550

Achieving Trust without Disclosure: Dark Pools and a Role for Secrecy-Preserving Verification (Invited Paper)
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

David Parkes, Christopher Thorpe, Wei Li
Short Lists in Centralized Clearinghouses
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Nicholas Arnosti
The Power of Weak Incentives
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Hector Lopez Carbajal
Are you Going to Do That? Contingent-Payment Mechanisms to Improve Coordination
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David Parkes, James Zou
A Double Auction for Querying the Web of Data
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Dmitry Moor, Tobias Grubenmann, Sven Seuken, Abraham Bernstein
A Robust Redesign of High School Match
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Sam Hwang
Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Nicholas Arnosti, Marissa Beck, Paul Milgrom
Auction Design with Advised Bidders
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Andrey Malenko, Anton Tsoy
Can “Complex” Market Designs Make it from Theory to Practice? Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Eric Budish
College Assignment as a Large Contest
Research Article in The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

AARON Bodoh-Creed, Brent Hickman