About | Contact Us | Register | Login
ProceedingsSeriesJournalsSearchEAI
sis 16(11): e4

Research Article

Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising

Download1140 downloads
Cite
BibTeX Plain Text
  • @ARTICLE{10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260678,
        author={Nicholas Arnosti and Marissa Beck and Paul Milgrom},
        title={Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising},
        journal={EAI Endorsed Transactions on Scalable Information Systems},
        volume={3},
        number={11},
        publisher={ACM},
        journal_a={SIS},
        year={2015},
        month={8},
        keywords={auctions, adverse selection, market design},
        doi={10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260678}
    }
    
  • Nicholas Arnosti
    Marissa Beck
    Paul Milgrom
    Year: 2015
    Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising
    SIS
    EAI
    DOI: 10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260678
Nicholas Arnosti1,*, Marissa Beck1, Paul Milgrom1
  • 1: Stanford University
*Contact email: narnosti@stanford.edu

Abstract

We model an online display advertising environment with brand advertisers and better-informed performance advertisers, and seek an auction mechanism that is strategy-proof, anonymous and insulates brand advertisers from adverse selection. We find that the only such mechanism that is also false-name proof assigns the item to the highest bidding performance advertiser only when the ratio of the highest bid to the second highest bid is sufficiently large. For fat-tailed match-value distributions, this new mechanism captures most of the gains from good matching and improves match values substantially compared to the common practice of setting aside impressions in advance.

Keywords
auctions, adverse selection, market design
Published
2015-08-13
Publisher
ACM
http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260678

Copyright © 2015 N. Arnosti et al., licensed to EAI. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unlimited use, distribution and reproduction in any medium so long as the original work is properly cited.

EBSCOProQuestDBLPDOAJPortico
EAI Logo

About EAI

  • Who We Are
  • Leadership
  • Research Areas
  • Partners
  • Media Center

Community

  • Membership
  • Conference
  • Recognition
  • Sponsor Us

Publish with EAI

  • Publishing
  • Journals
  • Proceedings
  • Books
  • EUDL