The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

Research Article

A Double Auction for Querying the Web of Data

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260632,
        author={Dmitry Moor and Tobias Grubenmann and Sven Seuken and Abraham Bernstein},
        title={A Double Auction for Querying the Web of Data},
        proceedings={The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications},
        publisher={ACM},
        proceedings_a={AMMA},
        year={2015},
        month={8},
        keywords={web of data mechanism design double auction},
        doi={10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260632}
    }
    
  • Dmitry Moor
    Tobias Grubenmann
    Sven Seuken
    Abraham Bernstein
    Year: 2015
    A Double Auction for Querying the Web of Data
    AMMA
    ICST
    DOI: 10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260632
Dmitry Moor1, Tobias Grubenmann1, Sven Seuken1,*, Abraham Bernstein1
  • 1: University of Zurich
*Contact email: seuken@ifi.uzh.ch

Abstract

Currently, the Web of Data (WoD) suffers from a lack of incentives for data providers. In this paper, we address this issue by designing a double auction to allocate answers (from data providers) to queries in the WoD. However, our domain exhibits a number of complicating features. Most importantly, the market mechanism only has estimates about what data is available to answer a specific query. Thus, there is "uncertainty about which goods exist in the market," and this may sometimes lead to inefficient allocations. If not handled properly, these inefficient allocations can make the payment rule infeasible because the "participation" constraint and the "budget balance" constraint may be violated. To address this, we propose three new payment rules that always satisfy the participation constraint, and compare the efficiency of these rules via a computational Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis.