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Issue 1
EAI Endorsed Transactions on Serious Games
Issue 11, 2016
Editor(s)-in-Chief:
Carlos Vaz de Carvalho
Articles
Information
Trading networks with bilateral contracts
Appears in:
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Authors:
Tamas Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Janko, Akihisa Tamura, Alexander Teytelboym
Abstract:
We study production networks in which firms match and sign bilateral contracts. Firms can buy from and sell to one another directly or via intermediaries. It is well-known that in this case group-stab
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le outcomes might not exist. We show that the problem of determining whether an allocation is …We study production networks in which firms match and sign bilateral contracts. Firms can buy from and sell to one another directly or via intermediaries. It is well-known that in this case group-stable outcomes might not exist. We show that the problem of determining whether an allocation is group-stable is NP-hard. We define a new stability concept, called trail stability, and show that any network of bilateral contracts has a trail-stable outcome whenever agents' preferences satisfy full substitutability. Trail-stable outcomes rule out consecutive and consistent pairwise blocks that form trails of contracts. Trail stability is a natural extension of chain stability and is a stronger solution concept in general contract networks. Trail-stable outcomes may not be immune to group deviations or efficient. In fact, we show that outcomes satisfying an even more demanding stability property -- full trail stability -- always exist. Fully trail-stable outcomes also rule out trail blocks, but an intermediary is not required to choose all contracts in the trail -- only local upstream-downstream pairs. We pin down conditions under which terminal contracts in trail-stable and fully trail-stable outcomes have a lattice structure. We describe the relationships between all stability concepts. When contracts specify trades and prices, we also show that trail-stable competitive equilibrium outcomes exist in networked markets even when agents' utility functions are not quasilinear. more »
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Experiments as Instruments: Heterogeneous Position Effects in Sponsored Search Auctions
Appears in:
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Authors:
Matthew Goldman, Justin Rao
Abstract:
Google and Bing employ a generalized second price (GSP) auction to allocate billions of dollars of sponsored search advertising. Despite evolving from a naive, first-price, rank-by-bid auction, the GS
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P has been shown to achieve an efficient allocation and favorable revenue properties via a tight …Google and Bing employ a generalized second price (GSP) auction to allocate billions of dollars of sponsored search advertising. Despite evolving from a naive, first-price, rank-by-bid auction, the GSP has been shown to achieve an efficient allocation and favorable revenue properties via a tight theoretical link with the equilibrium of the truthful Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. This link hinges on a critical assumption about the causal impact of ad position on user click probabilities: moving up increases click-through-rate by the same scaling factor for all ads. Because an ad’s position is the endogenous outcome of an auction, these assumptions have gone largely untested. We overcome this identification problem by developing a novel method to re-purpose internal business experimentation at a major search engine. Using a broad cross-section of advertisers we strongly reject the conventional multiplicatively-separable model, instead finding substantial heterogeneity of the causal impact of position on click-through-rates. For brand queries, off-brand competitors benefit much more from position than the advertiser matching the query. For generic queries, higher quality and less-well known websites benefit more from position. The impact of position differs by up to 100% across ad types. These findings raise serious concerns about the efficiency properties of the GSP as currently employed. more »
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Can “Complex” Market Designs Make it from Theory to Practice? Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton
Appears in:
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Author:
Eric Budish
Abstract:
Budish (2011) proposes a new mechanism for the problem of combinatorial assignment -- e.g., assigning students to schedules of courses -- called approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes
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(CEEI). While the CEEI mechanism satisfies attractive properties of efficiency, fairness, and incen…Budish (2011) proposes a new mechanism for the problem of combinatorial assignment -- e.g., assigning students to schedules of courses -- called approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI). While the CEEI mechanism satisfies attractive properties of efficiency, fairness, and incentives, it is “complicated” in several ways that one might reasonably wonder whether the theory could actually be implemented in the real world. This talk reports on two papers (Budish and Kessler, 2015; Budish et al., 2015) that helped bring this complex market design theory to successful implementation in practice, at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. The first paper reports on experiments conducted at Wharton to test the CEEI mechanism. In addition to showing that the CEEI mechanism improved the efficiency and fairness of the allocation, the experiment also serves as a roadmap for other market design researchers seeking to test complex mechanisms in practice. The second paper reports on the computational and economic engineering work involved in actually implementing the mechanism in practice. This involved modifications of the CEEI mechanism to deal with some of the issues caused by approximations in the theory, and a computational procedure that performs a massive parallel heuristic search, solving billions of mixed-integer programs along the way, to output an approximate competitive equilibrium in the fake-money economy for courses. more »
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A Robust Redesign of High School Match
Appears in:
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Author:
Sam Hwang
Abstract:
Many school districts allow students to report their preference rankings over schools and assign as many students as possible to their reported favorite schools. However, this well-intended assignment
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policy, known as the Boston mechanism, creates incentives for students to misreport their true pr…Many school districts allow students to report their preference rankings over schools and assign as many students as possible to their reported favorite schools. However, this well-intended assignment policy, known as the Boston mechanism, creates incentives for students to misreport their true preferences. I consider the problem of estimating students' preference parameters with reported rankings under this policy. Previous literature has made strong assumptions about the who and the how. In this paper I relax these assumptions. My identifying assumptions are that 1) students may have incorrect beliefs about their assignment probabilities as long as they correctly predict to which one of any given two schools they would have lower assignment probability; and 2) when deciding which ranking to report, students adhere to a simple rule: do not put a school on your ranking unless you prefer it to higher-probability ones. I construct moment inequalities that partially identify the preference parameters and propose an estimator of a confidence region of the parameters. Finally, I apply the method to data from Seoul, Korea to compare the efficiency and inequity of the Boston mechanism with Deferred Acceptance, an alternative assignment policy without incentives to misreport. Counterfactual simulations show that the Boston mechanism is more efficient than Deferred Acceptance, but it also penalizes students who naively report their true preferences. more »
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Scope
Games are structured contexts where players have clear objectives, with victory as the end goal. In a game, players must solve problems, overcome challenges and face opponents (real or game characters
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) but always respecting a clearly-defined set of rules. Failure to follow these rules implies a pun…Games are structured contexts where players have clear objectives, with victory as the end goal. In a game, players must solve problems, overcome challenges and face opponents (real or game characters) but always respecting a clearly-defined set of rules. Failure to follow these rules implies a punishment or penalty. Games can involve one player acting alone, two or more players acting cooperatively, or players or teams of players competing between themselves. Computer games are played through a computer, on a standalone or networked form. Games are highly interactive products that keep the player in a state of focused motivation, or “flow” as defined by Csikszentmihalyi. The player is always on the edge of his/her abilities, with the permanent feeling that he/she is about to reach the goal, about to go to the next level. This motivates the player to try, to give his/her best and to evolve. Serious Games are not designed for the sole purpose of entertainment but rather with training, educational, marketing or awareness raising objectives. These games are designed with the main goal of creating a skill development context for the player while retaining the same focused motivation context of “fun” games. The player must perform tasks, analyze processes and draw conclusions in order to increase his/her productivity and knowledge in the framework of the game positive and negative feedback, sometimes representing risks or a series of events that, in real life, would be negative or even fatal. This type of games is used in numerous areas like engineering, health, education, defense, military, emergency management, and scientific exploration, among many others. more »
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Topics
Topics to be addressed by the journal include but are not limited to: Serious games applications Games for marketing and advergames Games for training and skill development Games for research Games
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for social awareness Games for business, banking and finance Games for c… Topics to be addressed by the journal include but are not limited to: Serious games applications Games for marketing and advergames Games for training and skill development Games for research Games for social awareness Games for business, banking and finance Games for community engagement Games for healthcare and wellness Games for human resource training and development Games for patient rehabilitation and physiotherapy Games for senior citizens Serious games technology Virtual and augmented reality New interaction devices, toys and playthings Simulations 3D rendering technologies Games development for mobile devices Game engines and development tools Location-based games Artificial intelligence Serious games analytics Assessment and evaluation of serious games Serious game design and storyboarding User experience design Serious gamer psychology Serious game gender and age issues Social and collaborative serious games and confidentiality in serious games Case studies in serious games Classification, categorization of types of serious games Serious game research more »
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Indexing
DOAJ CrossRef OCLC Discovery Services EuroPub … DOAJ CrossRef OCLC Discovery Services EuroPub MIAR Publons Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek UlrichsWEB Hellenic Academic Libraries Link Ingenta Co
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nnect Computing Database (ProQuest) Publicly Available Content Database (ProQuest) SciTech Premium Collection (ProQuest) ProQuest Central Student (ProQuest) Norwegian Register for Scientific Journals, Series and Publishers more »
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Editorial Board
Andreea Molnar (Portsmouth University) Andrew Smith (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)) Antoni Jaume-i-Capó (Universitat de les Illes Balears) Ben Challis (Manchester Metropolitan
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University) Antonio Coehlo (University of Porto) Cristina Sylla (Unive… Andreea Molnar (Portsmouth University) Andrew Smith (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)) Antoni Jaume-i-Capó (Universitat de les Illes Balears) Ben Challis (Manchester Metropolitan University) Antonio Coehlo (University of Porto) Cristina Sylla (University of Minho) Edna Pasher (Edna Pasher PhD & Associates) Hariklia Tsalapatas (University of Thessaly) Fotis Liarokapis (Masaryk University) Ivan Martinez-Ortiz (Compultense University Madrid) Janet C Read (University of Central Lancashire) Joze Rugeli (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) Luis Miguel Girao (Artshare, Planetary Collegium, CESEM-FSCH-UNL) Manuel Ninaus (Leibniz-Institut für Wissensmedien - IWM) Martin Sillaots (Tallinn University) Natalia Padilla-Zea (Universidad Internacional de La Rioja (UNIR) Nick Kearney (Andamio Education and Technology S.L., Spain) Olga Timocenko (Aalborg University) Olivier Heidmann (University of Thessaly) Paula Escudeiro (Instituto Superior de Engenharia do Porto, Portugal) Pedro Latorre (University of Zaragoza) Rosa Reis (Instituto Superior de Engenharia do Porto, Portugal) Miralem Helmefalk (Linnaeus University, Sweden) Rui Prada (Instituto Superior Técnico, University of Lisbon) Silvia Gabrielli (CREATE-NET, Italy) Silvia Margarita Baldiris Navarro (Silvia Margarita Baldiris Navarro) Theo Lim (Heriot-Watt University) more »
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Journal Blurb
EAI Endorsed Transactions on Serious Games is an open access, peer-reviewed scholarly journal focused on serious games applications, serious games technology, serious games analytics, user experience
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design and more. The journal publishes research articles, review articles, commentaries, editorials…EAI Endorsed Transactions on Serious Games is an open access, peer-reviewed scholarly journal focused on serious games applications, serious games technology, serious games analytics, user experience design and more. The journal publishes research articles, review articles, commentaries, editorials, technical articles, and short communications with a biannual frequency. Authors are not charged for article submission and processing. more »
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Publisher
EAI
ISSN
2034-8800
Volume
3
Published
2016-12-28