4th International ICST Conference on Wireless Internet

Research Article

A Negotiation Game for Multichannel Access in Cognitive Radio Networks

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/ICST.WICON2008.4943,
        author={Hua Liu and Longbo Huang and Bhaskar Krishnamachari and Qing Zhao},
        title={A Negotiation Game for Multichannel Access in Cognitive Radio Networks},
        proceedings={4th International ICST Conference on Wireless Internet},
        publisher={ICST},
        proceedings_a={WICON},
        year={2010},
        month={5},
        keywords={cognitive radio opportunistic spectrum access multiple secondary users channel negotiation},
        doi={10.4108/ICST.WICON2008.4943}
    }
    
  • Hua Liu
    Longbo Huang
    Bhaskar Krishnamachari
    Qing Zhao
    Year: 2010
    A Negotiation Game for Multichannel Access in Cognitive Radio Networks
    WICON
    ICST
    DOI: 10.4108/ICST.WICON2008.4943
Hua Liu1,*, Longbo Huang2,*, Bhaskar Krishnamachari2,*, Qing Zhao3,*
  • 1: Department of Computer Science, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089
  • 2: Ming Hsieh Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089
  • 3: Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of California, Davis CA 95616
*Contact email: hual@usc.edu, longbohu@usc.edu, bkrishna@usc.edu, qzhao@ece.ucdavis.edu

Abstract

We consider the problem of efficient opportunistic spectrum access in cognitive radio networks where there are multiple secondary users trying to share access to multiple channels. In our formulation, each user has a potentially different valuation of each channel and wishes to pick a channel in such a way as to maximize its benefit without interfering with other users. There is a fundamental tradeoff in this problem -- while information about other secondary users is useful in making a good channel sensing/access decision, the communication cost of gathering this information must be taken into account. We formulate the problem as a multi-round negotiation game in which the users try to gather "just-enough-information" to make their decisions. The channel valuations are modeled as independently uniformly distributed random variables between 0 and 1. We propose a threshold-based channel sensing policy based on observations from a previous work. For a two-user two-channel setting, we calculate optimal thresholds, and obtain the corresponding performance for cases with no information exchange, partial information exchange, and full information exchange. We then show how the optimal amount of information exchange varies with the cost of negotiation.