5th International ICST Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications

Research Article

Pricing in noncooperative interference channels for improved energy-efficiency

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/ICST.CROWNCOM2010.9101,
        author={Rami Mochaourab and Zhijiat Chong and and Eduard Jorswieck},
        title={Pricing in noncooperative interference channels for improved energy-efficiency},
        proceedings={5th International ICST Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications},
        publisher={IEEE},
        proceedings_a={CROWNCOM},
        year={2010},
        month={9},
        keywords={Games Interference channels Nash equilibrium Power control Pricing Resource management},
        doi={10.4108/ICST.CROWNCOM2010.9101}
    }
    
  • Rami Mochaourab
    Zhijiat Chong
    and Eduard Jorswieck
    Year: 2010
    Pricing in noncooperative interference channels for improved energy-efficiency
    CROWNCOM
    IEEE
    DOI: 10.4108/ICST.CROWNCOM2010.9101
Rami Mochaourab1,*, Zhijiat Chong1,*, and Eduard Jorswieck1,*
  • 1: Communications Theory, Communications Laboratory, Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany
*Contact email: Mochaourab@ifn.et.tu-dresden.de, Chong@ifn.et.tu-dresden.de, Jorswieck@ifn.et.tu-dresden.de

Abstract

We consider noncooperative energy-efficient resource allocation in the interference channel. Energy-efficiency is achieved when each system pays a price proportional to its allocated transmit power. In noncooperative game-theoretic notation, the power allocation chosen by the systems corresponds to the Nash equilibrium. We study the existence and characterize the uniqueness of this equilibrium. Afterwards, pricing to achieve energy-efficiency is examined. We introduce an arbitrator who determines the prices that satisfy minimum QoS requirements and minimize total power consumption. This energy-efficient assignment problem is formulated and solved. Simulation results on energy-efficiency are then given where we compare our setting to the one without pricing. It is observed that pricing in this distributed setting achieves higher energy-efficiency in different interference regimes.