6th International ICST Conference on Broadband Communications, Networks, and Systems

Research Article

Non-cooperative Optimal Game-Theoretic Opportunistic Dynamic Spectrum Access

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/ICST.BROADNETS2009.7301,
        author={Oliver Yu and Emir Saric},
        title={Non-cooperative Optimal Game-Theoretic Opportunistic Dynamic Spectrum Access},
        proceedings={6th International ICST Conference on Broadband Communications, Networks, and Systems},
        publisher={IEEE},
        proceedings_a={BROADNETS},
        year={2009},
        month={11},
        keywords={Access protocols Chromium FCC Frequency Game theory Nash equilibrium Resource management Space technology Spread spectrum communication Wireless networks},
        doi={10.4108/ICST.BROADNETS2009.7301}
    }
    
  • Oliver Yu
    Emir Saric
    Year: 2009
    Non-cooperative Optimal Game-Theoretic Opportunistic Dynamic Spectrum Access
    BROADNETS
    IEEE
    DOI: 10.4108/ICST.BROADNETS2009.7301
Oliver Yu1, Emir Saric1
  • 1: Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of competitive sharing of open spectrum resources between collocated spread spectrum based secondary systems. The problem is formulated as a strategic form game where the objective of each player (secondary system) is to maximize its own payoff defined in terms of resource utilizations. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the optimal Nash equilibrium solution are derived for the specified payoff functions. Using tools of the noncooperative game theory, the Payoff-Enriched Adaptive Learning (PEAL) methodology is proposed to enable each secondary system to iteratively adapt spectrum access strategy in response to the observed interference from other secondary systems. The self-learning adaptations of PEAL require neither signaling nor time synchronization between autonomous secondary systems. It is shown through extensive numerical evaluations that the PEAL adaptations converge to the theoretical Nash equilibrium in a finite numbers of trials.