Game Theory for Networks. Third International ICST Conference, GameNets 2012, Vancouver, BC, Canada, May 24-26, 2012, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

Establishing Network Reputation via Mechanism Design

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_4,
        author={Parinaz Ardabili and Mingyan Liu},
        title={Establishing Network Reputation via Mechanism Design},
        proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. Third International ICST Conference, GameNets 2012, Vancouver, BC, Canada, May 24-26, 2012, Revised Selected Papers},
        proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
        year={2012},
        month={12},
        keywords={Mechanism Design Network Reputation Incentives},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_4}
    }
    
  • Parinaz Ardabili
    Mingyan Liu
    Year: 2012
    Establishing Network Reputation via Mechanism Design
    GAMENETS
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_4
Parinaz Ardabili1,*, Mingyan Liu1,*
  • 1: University of Michigan
*Contact email: naghizad@umich.edu, mingyan@umich.edu

Abstract

In any system of networks, such as the Internet, a network must take some measure of security into account when deciding whether to allow incoming traffic, and how to configure various filters when making routing decisions. Existing methods tend to rely on the quality of specific hosts in making such decisions, resulting in mostly reactive security policies. In this study we investigate the notion of reputation of a , and focus on constructing mechanisms that incentivizes the participation of networks to provide information about themselves as well as others. Such information is collected by a centralized , who then computes a for each network. We use a simple mechanism to demonstrate that not only a network has the incentive to provide information about itself (even though it is in general not true), but also that this information can help decrease the estimation error.