Research Article
An Energy-Efficient Power Allocation Game with Selfish Channel State Reporting in Cellular Networks
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/valuetools.2012.250288, author={Francois Meriaux and Stefan Valentin and Samson Lasaulce and Michel Kieffer}, title={An Energy-Efficient Power Allocation Game with Selfish Channel State Reporting in Cellular Networks}, proceedings={6th International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools}, publisher={IEEE}, proceedings_a={VALUETOOLS}, year={2012}, month={11}, keywords={energy efficiency power allocation feedback game theory}, doi={10.4108/valuetools.2012.250288} }
- Francois Meriaux
Stefan Valentin
Samson Lasaulce
Michel Kieffer
Year: 2012
An Energy-Efficient Power Allocation Game with Selfish Channel State Reporting in Cellular Networks
VALUETOOLS
ICST
DOI: 10.4108/valuetools.2012.250288
Abstract
With energy-efficient resource allocation, mobile users and base station have different objectives. While the base station strives for an energy-efficient operation of the complete cell, each user aims to maximize its own data rate. To obtain this individual benefit, users may selfishly adjust their Channel State Information (CSI) reports, reducing the cell's energy efficiency. To analyze this conflict of interest, we formalize energy-efficient power allocation as a utility maximization problem and present a simple algorithm that performs close to the optimum. By formulating selfish CSI reporting as a game, we prove the existence of an unique equilibrium and characterize energy efficiency with true and selfish CSI in closed form. Our numerical results show that, surprisingly, energy-efficient power allocation in small cells is more robust against selfish CSI than cells with large transmit powers. This and further design rules show that our paper provides valuable theoretical insight to energy-efficient networks when CSI reports cannot be trusted.