Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auction for Dynamic Spectrum Access

Ali Kakhbod; Ashutosh Nayyar; Demosthenis Teneketzis

5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools

Research Article

Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auction for Dynamic Spectrum Access

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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/valuetools.2011.247346,
    author={Ali Kakhbod and Ashutosh Nayyar and Demosthenis Teneketzis},
    title={Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auction for Dynamic Spectrum Access},
    proceedings={5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools},
    publisher={ICST},
    proceedings_a={VALUETOOLS},
    year={2012},
    month={7},
    keywords={spectrum auction},
    doi={10.4108/valuetools.2011.247346}
}

Ali Kakhbod
Ashutosh Nayyar
Demosthenis Teneketzis
Year: 2012
Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auction for Dynamic Spectrum Access
VALUETOOLS
ICST
DOI: 10.4108/valuetools.2011.247346

Ali Kakhbod¹^,*, Ashutosh Nayyar¹, Demosthenis Teneketzis¹

1: Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

*Contact email: fakakhbod@umich.edu

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the revenue maximization problem in auctions for dynamic spectrum access. We assume a frequency division method of spectrum sharing with a primary spectrum owner that can divide the available spectrum into sub-bands and sell them to secondary users. We assume that a secondary user’s utility function is linear in the rate it can achieve by using the spectrum. We present an incentive compatible, individual rational and revenue-maximizing mechanism that the spectrum owner can use to divide the spectrum among the strategic (selfish) secondary buyers.

Keywords: spectrum auction

Published: 2012-07-12
Publisher: ICST

: http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/valuetools.2011.247346