Research Article
Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auction for Dynamic Spectrum Access
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/valuetools.2011.247346, author={Ali Kakhbod and Ashutosh Nayyar and Demosthenis Teneketzis}, title={Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auction for Dynamic Spectrum Access}, proceedings={5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools}, publisher={ICST}, proceedings_a={VALUETOOLS}, year={2012}, month={7}, keywords={spectrum auction}, doi={10.4108/valuetools.2011.247346} }- Ali Kakhbod
Ashutosh Nayyar
Demosthenis Teneketzis
Year: 2012
Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auction for Dynamic Spectrum Access
VALUETOOLS
ICST
DOI: 10.4108/valuetools.2011.247346
Abstract
In this paper, we consider the revenue maximization problem in auctions for dynamic spectrum access. We assume a frequency division method of spectrum sharing with a primary spectrum owner that can divide the available spectrum into sub-bands and sell them to secondary users. We assume that a secondary user’s utility function is linear in the rate it can achieve by using the spectrum. We present an incentive compatible, individual rational and revenue-maximizing mechanism that the spectrum owner can use to divide the spectrum among the strategic (selfish) secondary buyers.
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