4th International ICST Conference on Wireless Internet

Research Article

A Cut-off Phenomenon in Location Based Random Access Games with Imperfect Information

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/ICST.WICON2008.4905,
        author={Hazer Inaltekin and Mung Chiang and H. Vincent Poor},
        title={A Cut-off Phenomenon in Location Based Random Access Games with Imperfect Information},
        proceedings={4th International ICST Conference on Wireless Internet},
        publisher={ICST},
        proceedings_a={WICON},
        year={2010},
        month={5},
        keywords={Random access imperfect information sel},
        doi={10.4108/ICST.WICON2008.4905}
    }
    
  • Hazer Inaltekin
    Mung Chiang
    H. Vincent Poor
    Year: 2010
    A Cut-off Phenomenon in Location Based Random Access Games with Imperfect Information
    WICON
    ICST
    DOI: 10.4108/ICST.WICON2008.4905
Hazer Inaltekin1,*, Mung Chiang1,*, H. Vincent Poor1,*
  • 1: Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
*Contact email: hinaltek@princeton.edu, chiangm@princeton.edu, poor@princeton.edu

Abstract

This paper analyzes the behavior of selfsh transmitters under imperfect location information. The scenario considered is that of a wireless network consisting of selfsh nodes that are randomly distributed over the network domain according to a known probability distribution, and that are interested in communicating with a common sink node using common radio resources. In this scenario, the wireless nodes do not know the exact locations of their competitors but rather have belief distributions about these locations. Firstly, properties of the packet success probability curve as a function of the node-sink separation are obtained for such networks. Secondly, a monotonicity property for the bestresponse strategies of selfsh nodes is identifed. That is, for any given strategies of competitors of a node, there exists a critical node-sink separation for this node such that its bestresponse is to transmit when its distance to the sink node is smaller than this critical threshold, and to back off otherwise. Finally, necessary and suffcient conditions for a given strategy profle to be a Nash equilibrium are provided.