2nd International ICST Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks

Research Article

Introducing Hierarchy in Energy-Efficient Power Control Games

        author={Yezekael Hayel and Samson Lasaulce and Rachid El-Azouzi and Merouane Debbah},
        title={Introducing Hierarchy in Energy-Efficient Power Control Games},
        proceedings={2nd International ICST Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks},
        keywords={Energy-efficiency multiple access channel Nash equilibrium power control game Stackelberg equilibrium.},
  • Yezekael Hayel
    Samson Lasaulce
    Rachid El-Azouzi
    Merouane Debbah
    Year: 2010
    Introducing Hierarchy in Energy-Efficient Power Control Games
    DOI: 10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4485
Yezekael Hayel1,*, Samson Lasaulce2,*, Rachid El-Azouzi1,*, Merouane Debbah3,*
  • 1: Lab. Informatique d’Avignon, Universite d’Avignon, 84911, Avignon, France
  • 2: Lab. des Signaux et Systemes, CNRS - Supelec - Paris Sud, 91190, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
  • 3: Alcatel-Lucent Chair, Supelec, 91190, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
*Contact email: yezekael.hayel@univ-avignon.fr, lasaulce@lss.supelec.fr, rachid.elazouzi@univ-avignon.fr, merouane.debbah@supelec.fr


We consider a multiple access channel where the users choose their best power control strategy in order to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency. To increase the utilities with respect to the classical non-cooperative game, we introduce hierarchy in two ways. On the one hand, assuming single-user decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg formulation of the game where one user is the leader. On the other hand, assuming neither leader nor followers among the users, we introduce hierarchy by using successive interference cancellation at the receiver. For both cases, we study the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium and compare the individual performance obtained in the hierarchical game with that obtained in the non-cooperative game. An exhaustive comparative analysis of the two games is also conducted. In order to optimize the choice of the leader in the Stackelberg formulation (with single user decoding) and that of the decoding order (in the non-cooperative game with successive interference cancelation), we study two measures of global energy-efficiency for the network and discussions are provided for each case.