5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools

Research Article

Dynamic Power Allocation Games in Parallel Multiple Access Channels

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/icst.valuetools.2011.245731,
        author={Panayotis Mertikopoulos and Elena Belmega and Aris Moustakas and Samson Lasaulce},
        title={Dynamic Power Allocation Games in Parallel Multiple Access Channels},
        proceedings={5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools},
        publisher={ICST},
        proceedings_a={VALUETOOLS},
        year={2012},
        month={6},
        keywords={non-cooperative games nash equilibrium potential games power allocation replicator dynamics},
        doi={10.4108/icst.valuetools.2011.245731}
    }
    
  • Panayotis Mertikopoulos
    Elena Belmega
    Aris Moustakas
    Samson Lasaulce
    Year: 2012
    Dynamic Power Allocation Games in Parallel Multiple Access Channels
    VALUETOOLS
    ICST
    DOI: 10.4108/icst.valuetools.2011.245731
Panayotis Mertikopoulos1,*, Elena Belmega2, Aris Moustakas1, Samson Lasaulce2
  • 1: University of Athens
  • 2: Supélec
*Contact email: pmertik@phys.uoa.gr

Abstract

We analyze the distributed power allocation problem in parallel multiple access channels (MAC) by studying an associated non-cooperative game which admits an exact potential function. Even though games of this type have been the subject of considerable study in the literature, we find that the sufficient conditions which ensure uniqueness of Nash equilibrium points typically do not hold in this context. Nonetheless, we show that the parallel MAC game admits a unique equilibrium almost surely, thus establishing an important class of counterexamples where these sufficient conditions are not necessary. Furthermore, if the network's users employ a distributed learning scheme based on the replicator dynamics, we show that they converge to equilibrium from almost any initial condition, even though users only have local information at their disposal.