3d International ICST Conference on Bio-Inspired Models of Network, Information, and Computing Systems

Research Article

On Socially-Inspired Cooperative and Efficient Overlay Network Evolution based on Group Selection Pattern

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/ICST.BIONETICS2008.4673,
        author={Yufeng Wang and Akihiro Nakao},
        title={On Socially-Inspired Cooperative and Efficient Overlay Network Evolution based on Group Selection Pattern},
        proceedings={3d International ICST Conference on Bio-Inspired Models of Network, Information, and Computing Systems},
        publisher={ICST},
        proceedings_a={BIONETICS},
        year={2010},
        month={5},
        keywords={Overlay network evolutionary game small-world network},
        doi={10.4108/ICST.BIONETICS2008.4673}
    }
    
  • Yufeng Wang
    Akihiro Nakao
    Year: 2010
    On Socially-Inspired Cooperative and Efficient Overlay Network Evolution based on Group Selection Pattern
    BIONETICS
    ICST
    DOI: 10.4108/ICST.BIONETICS2008.4673
Yufeng Wang1,2,*, Akihiro Nakao3,2,*
  • 1: Nanjing University of Posts and Telecomm., China.
  • 2: National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Japan.
  • 3: University of Tokyo, Japan.
*Contact email: wfwang@nict.go.jp, nakao@iii.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Abstract

In overlay networks, interplay between network structure and dynamics remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we study dynamic co-evolution between individual strategies (cooperative or defect) and overlay network structures. Inspired by evolutionary game theory, we propose a general scheme to evolve a given overlay into the resulting topology, which has high global network efficiency and average clustering coefficient that indicate high small-world-ness. In our scheme, peers’ local interactions integrate network reciprocity and group selection algorithm, and lead to the emergence of cooperative and efficient overlay network structure. Specifically, we design a link-formation game to characterize the social dilemma of forming links in overlay network, which means that, in this game, defection always gives individual peers a higher payoff regardless of what opponent’s strategy is, but, the aggregation of payoffs by mutual cooperative peers is always better than all other cases. In its evolutionary link formation phase, we adopt simple economic process-each peer keeps one link to cooperative neighbor in its neighborhood. Our simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can drive a given overlay network into fully cooperative and efficient small-world structure.