11th EAI International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools

Research Article

Capacity Expansion of Neutral ISPs via Content Peering Charges: The Bargaining Edge

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/eai.5-12-2017.2274422,
        author={Anand  Kalvit and Gaurav  Kasbekar and D  Manjunath and Jayakrishnan  Nair},
        title={Capacity Expansion of Neutral ISPs via Content Peering Charges: The Bargaining Edge},
        proceedings={11th EAI International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools},
        publisher={ACM},
        proceedings_a={VALUETOOLS},
        year={2018},
        month={8},
        keywords={network neutrality paid peering internet economics interconnection markets},
        doi={10.4108/eai.5-12-2017.2274422}
    }
    
  • Anand Kalvit
    Gaurav Kasbekar
    D Manjunath
    Jayakrishnan Nair
    Year: 2018
    Capacity Expansion of Neutral ISPs via Content Peering Charges: The Bargaining Edge
    VALUETOOLS
    ACM
    DOI: 10.4108/eai.5-12-2017.2274422
Anand Kalvit1, Gaurav Kasbekar1, D Manjunath1, Jayakrishnan Nair1,*
  • 1: IIT Bombay
*Contact email: jayakrishnan.nair@ee.iitb.ac.in

Abstract

Many internet service providers (ISPs) operate under network neu-trality regulations which forbid smart data pricing schemes such asthose that provide differential QoS or differential pricing, leading tolower profitability. Increasing bandwidth-hungry content is mak-ing the consumers demand improved ISP infrastructure. With therisk of poor consumer experience squarely on the ISP, the ISPs areforced to invest in their infrastructure with little scope for moneti-sation via innovative user pricing. And they are asking the contentproviders (CPs) to pick up some of the tab for ISP capacity expan-sion. In this paper we explore the possibility of network neutralcapacity expansion sponsored by voluntary peering charges fromCPs.We consider the scenario where CPs peer with an ISP and takethe lead in paying peering charges with the caveat that this hasto be used for capacity expansion. Since ISP capacity expansioncan benefit all the CPs, and possibly even the ISP, selfish CPs willdetermine their charges strategically. We consider three models forthe CPs to interact in determining the charge—a cooperative model,a non-cooperative model, and a bargaining model. Our analysis re-veals a rather surprising result. We show that the bargaining modelleads to a higher investment in the ISP infrastructure than eventhe cooperative model. This leads us to recommend policies thatpromote transparency in the interconnection agreements betweenCPs and ISPs.