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ws 16(9): e4

Research Article

A Posted-Price Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrum Sharing under Budget Constraints

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  • @ARTICLE{10.4108/eai.3-12-2015.2262496,
        author={Wen-Hsiang Lai and Pavol Polacek and Chih-Wei Huang},
        title={A Posted-Price Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrum Sharing under Budget Constraints},
        journal={EAI Endorsed Transactions on Wireless Spectrum},
        volume={2},
        number={9},
        publisher={ACM},
        journal_a={WS},
        year={2016},
        month={5},
        keywords={spectrum sharing, cognitive radio, game theory, auction algorithm},
        doi={10.4108/eai.3-12-2015.2262496}
    }
    
  • Wen-Hsiang Lai
    Pavol Polacek
    Chih-Wei Huang
    Year: 2016
    A Posted-Price Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrum Sharing under Budget Constraints
    WS
    EAI
    DOI: 10.4108/eai.3-12-2015.2262496
Wen-Hsiang Lai1, Pavol Polacek1, Chih-Wei Huang1,*
  • 1: National Central University,Taiwan
*Contact email: cwhuang@cc.ncu.edu.tw

Abstract

The concept of cognitive radio is emerging as a platform for designing next generation wireless networks with dynamic resource sharing among machines. However, how to efficiently and fairly share the spare channels is still a topic under intensive research. This paper investigates a spectrum trading problem under relatively realistic settings, where heterogeneous channels under buyers' budget constraints are specifically considered, while maintaining incentive compatibility and individual rationality. The proposed auction game consists of a price-setting primary owner (PO), targeting on maximizing its total revenue, and secondary users (SUs), bidding channels for reasonable values. To handle channel heterogeneity, SUs provide independent valuation according to observed quality on different channels. The PO adopts a sequential arbitrary-order mechanism for flexible deployment and achieving aforementioned economic properties in polynomial time. Finally, the numerical results show performance improvements in PO revenue and SU utility over reference approaches.

Keywords
spectrum sharing, cognitive radio, game theory, auction algorithm
Published
2016-05-24
Publisher
ACM
http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.3-12-2015.2262496

Copyright © 2015 C.-W. Huang et al., licensed to EAI. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unlimited use, distribution and reproduction in any medium so long as the original work is properly cited.

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