Research Article
Analysis for Patent Licensing Schemes and Remanufacturing Strategies with Platform
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/eai.26-5-2023.2337285, author={Yan Wang}, title={Analysis for Patent Licensing Schemes and Remanufacturing Strategies with Platform}, proceedings={Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Education, Knowledge and Information Management, ICEKIM 2023, May 26--28, 2023, Nanjing, China}, publisher={EAI}, proceedings_a={ICEKIM}, year={2023}, month={9}, keywords={royalty licensing; fixed-fee licensing; remanufacturing strategy; platform commis-sion; stackelberg game;}, doi={10.4108/eai.26-5-2023.2337285} }- Yan Wang
Year: 2023
Analysis for Patent Licensing Schemes and Remanufacturing Strategies with Platform
ICEKIM
EAI
DOI: 10.4108/eai.26-5-2023.2337285
Abstract
The manufacturer's patented products have core intellectual property rights, which poses legal issues for other remanufacturers to participate in remanufacturing. At the same time, the proportional commission in platform selling implies a new revenue al-location mechanism, which makes the patent licensing different from that in traditional supply chains. This study explores a Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) system where original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) hold product patents and decide on re-manufacturing modes. According to the Stackelberg game theory and Optimization method, a game model with a leader (OEM) and a follower (platform) is then intro-duced, and the equilibrium characteristics with respect to production decisions and li-censing decisions are derived. Basing analysis and simulation, the conclusions are got: Firstly, both in-house remanufacturing and royalty licensing are not the only dominant strategies, because recycling rate is related to the recycling scale parameter and the commission rate, and remanufacturing costs are key factors affecting both parties' profits. Secondly, fixed-fee licensing is an available mechanism for OEMs and plat-forms to reach cooperation on authorization.