The Three-Party Evolutionary Game of Cooperation Between Upstream and Downstream Enterprises Under Government Subsidies

The successful development of upstream and downstream enterprises cooperation need to solve the game problem among the actors. To this end, based on government subsidies, and then a tripartite game system for upstream and downstream enterprises cooperation can be constructed. The purpose of this paper is to construct a revenue matrix with different strategy combinations and to determine the expected revenue of each participant by analyzing the interrelationship between this matrix and the probability of strategy selection. In addition, based on the Malthusian principle, we propose a new replication dynamic equation for the cooperation of upstream and downstream enterprises under government subsidies, and further investigate the game evolution law of strategic behavior. Numerical analysis and system simulation results show that:(1) after a long-term evolution process, the system eventually has three stable strategies. The first one is that the government actively subsidizes, upstream and downstream enterprises actively cooperate, and consumers choose to consume; the second one is that the government does not subsidize, upstream and downstream enterprises actively cooperate, and consumers choose to consume; the third one is that the government actively subsidizes, upstream and downstream enterprises do not cooperate, and consumers choose to consume.