Cooperation Between a Scenic Spot and an Energy Service Company Based on Contract Energy Management

Energy conservation and emission reduction are important for all countries, and the problem of high energy consumption in scenic spots is increasingly prominent. Contract energy management (EPC) can effectively make up for the lack of energy-saving technology and experience for scenic spots. Based on the benefit sharing contract mode of energy conservation, this paper establishes two-stage Stackelberg game models between the scenic spot as energy user (EU) and the energy service company (ESCO), and analyses the allocation of energy conservation subsidies in EPC projects. The study found some conclusions. First, when the energy saving of an EPC project reaches the subsidy standard and the EU gains all energy saving subsidies, the ESCO will not sign an energy saving revenue sharing EPC project contract with the EU. Second, compared with other subsidy allocation scenarios, the optimal energy saving income sharing ratio of the EU is the highest when the energy saving of EPC projects reaches the subsidy standard and all the energy saving subsidies are allocated to the ESCO. Third, when the unit energy saving subsidy is high, in the cases that the energy saving subsidy standard is met and the energy saving subsidy is shared by the ESCO and the EU or the energy saving subsidy is fully allocated to the ESCO, the optimal energy saving is higher than the optimal energy saving when the EPC project does not meet the energy saving subsidy standard.