An Analysis of Institutional Investor Governance Behavior from the Perspective of Portfolio

As a third-party force independent of management and shareholders, institutional investors have been highly expected by domestic and foreign scholars and government regulators to improve corporate governance. However, there are still three debates on the role of institutional investors in corporate governance: effective supervision, invalid supervision and strategic collusion. In order to answer the question of what role institutional investors play in corporate governance, the article takes the two types of agency costs of enterprises as the starting point, re-examines the governance behavior of institutional investors from the perspective of investment portfolios, and explains its Participating in a contingency view of governance behavior. Based on principal-agent theory and limited attention theory, the sample data of my country's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2017 are used. By defining supervised institutional investors, from the two dimensions of portfolio weight and portfolio concentration, the fixed effect regression model is used to empirically test the impact of institutional investors on the two types of agency costs of the company, and the instrumental variable method is used to make robust results. At the same time, combined with different situations inside and outside the company, with the help of sub-sample test, it dialectically analyzes the differences in the governance behavior of institutional investors.