Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Engineering Management and Information Science, EMIS 2023, February 24-26, 2023, Chengdu, China

Research Article

Evolutionary game analysis of digital platform monopoly and market supervision from the perspective of system dynamics

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/eai.24-2-2023.2330626,
        author={Shengyuan  Wang and Yue  Yang and Jie  Wu},
        title={Evolutionary game analysis of digital platform monopoly and market supervision from the perspective of system dynamics},
        proceedings={Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Engineering Management and Information Science, EMIS 2023, February 24-26, 2023, Chengdu, China},
        publisher={EAI},
        proceedings_a={EMIS},
        year={2023},
        month={6},
        keywords={digital platforms; antitrust; market regulation; evolutionary games; system dynamics},
        doi={10.4108/eai.24-2-2023.2330626}
    }
    
  • Shengyuan Wang
    Yue Yang
    Jie Wu
    Year: 2023
    Evolutionary game analysis of digital platform monopoly and market supervision from the perspective of system dynamics
    EMIS
    EAI
    DOI: 10.4108/eai.24-2-2023.2330626
Shengyuan Wang1,*, Yue Yang1, Jie Wu2
  • 1: Liaoning Technical University
  • 2: Dalian Maritime University
*Contact email: 1640023825@qq.com

Abstract

In the context of the digital economy, to curb the monopolistic behavior of service digital platforms, guide and regulate the order of platform competition. This paper combines system dynamics and game theory to construct an evolutionary game model and a system dynamics model between the two subjects concerning the monopolistic behavior of digital platforms and the regulatory decisions of market regulators. This paper finds that: (1) market regulators will adopt an aggressive regulatory strategy as the level of punishment and additional revenue increases; in addition, for cases where the platform involves a smaller degree of monopoly and has a lower impact on the market, the regulator may decide to terminate the investigation and adopt a no-regulation strategy; (2) internet platforms will finally adopt a no-monopoly strategy as their overall revenue decreases due to the increase in punishment; they will also adopt a no-monopoly strategy as own opportunity gain loss increases and choose the monopoly strategy. Based on the above simulation conclusions, it provides reference and reference for the benign development of the platform market about the governance of platform monopoly and the protection of consumers' legitimate rights and interests.