Research Article
Security Analysis of Quantization Schemes for Channel-based Key Extraction
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/eai.22-7-2015.2260194, author={Christian Zenger and Jan Zimmer and Christof Paar}, title={Security Analysis of Quantization Schemes for Channel-based Key Extraction}, proceedings={Workshop on Wireless Communication Security at the Physical Layer}, publisher={EAI}, proceedings_a={WICOMSEC-PHY}, year={2015}, month={8}, keywords={channel-based key extraction physical layer security practice-oriented protocols quantization schemes on-line entropy estimation security analysis}, doi={10.4108/eai.22-7-2015.2260194} }- Christian Zenger
Jan Zimmer
Christof Paar
Year: 2015
Security Analysis of Quantization Schemes for Channel-based Key Extraction
WICOMSEC-PHY
ACM
DOI: 10.4108/eai.22-7-2015.2260194
Abstract
The use of reciprocal and random properties of wireless channels for the generation of secret keys is a highly attractive option for many applications that operate in a mobile environment. In recent years, several practice-oriented protocols have been proposed, but unfortunately without a sufficient and consistent security analysis and without a fair comparison between each other. This can be attributed to the fact that until now neither a common evaluation basis, nor a security metric in an on-line scenario (e.g., with changing channel properties) was proposed. We attempt to close this gap by presenting test vectors based on a large measurement campaign, an extensive comparative evaluation framework (including ten protocols as well as new on-line entropy estimators), and a rigorous experimental security analysis. Further, we answer for the first time a variety of security and performance related questions about the behavior of 10 channel-based key establishment schemes from the literature.
