Dissecting Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria and Organisational Resilience

Boko Haram (Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, JAS) remains one of Africa’s most resilient insurgent groups despite sustained leadership decapitation efforts by the Nigerian state. This paper examines why the removal of key commanders has failed to dismantle the group and has sometimes coincided with adaptation, fragmentation, and continued violence. Moving beyond leader-focused counterterrorism, it reconceptualises Boko Haram as a violent social movement shaped by governance failures, ideological cohesion, and decentralised structures. Using a qualitative case study design, the study draws on interviews with military personnel and journalists, alongside analysis of insurgent communiqués, policy reports, and academic literature. Guided by Social Movement Theory, it explains Boko Haram’s resilience through decentralised command systems, leadership succession mechanisms, resource mobilisation, and ideological framing that sustains recruitment and cohesion beyond leaders. Findings show that leadership decapitation produces only short-term disruption and does not significantly weaken the group where succession systems and ideological continuity persist. The paper argues that effective counterterrorism must extend beyond leadership targeting to include governance reforms that strengthen legitimacy, accountability, rule of law, and civilian administration, alongside community-based counter-radicalisation involving religious leaders, local actors, and civil society.