Research on the Relationship Between Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance Under Mixed Ownership Reform

In the course of China's economic development, state-owned enterprises have always occupied an extremely important position. As the core of the current economic system reform, the reform of state-owned enterprises has received extensive attention from all walks of life. Under the current premise of comprehensively deepening reform, the main theme of marketization of state-owned enterprise reform has never changed. In the last round of state-owned enterprise salary system reform represented by the "salary limit order", it actually aggravated the policy constraints of state-owned enterprises. The new round of state-owned enterprise reform characterized by mixed ownership reform relies on the introduction of market-oriented shareholders of other ownership systems, so as to promote all ownership capitals to learn from each other's strong points, complement each other's weaknesses, promote each other's development, and realize the amplification function of state-owned capital. Under the background that most state-owned enterprises are actively responding to the reform of mixed ownership, mixed ownership enterprises pose new challenges to the salary incentive system of state-owned enterprises. Due to the low operating efficiency of most state-owned enterprises, the phenomenon of "sky high salary" for senior executives and "upside down performance" emerge one after another, which leads to the lack of vitality and risk resistance ability of state-owned enterprises.