Evolutionary Game Analysis of Digital Warehouse Receipt Pledges Considering Blockchain Under B2B Platforms

The technological advantages of third-party B2B supply chain bill service platforms, such as online docking, real-time information and big data, provide banks with the possibility to realize the supervision of digital warehouse receipt pledge financing. This paper considers the existence of collusion in warehouse receipt pledge financing, and constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of enterprises, banks and platforms of B2B bills under the consideration of whether banks apply blockchain regulation, explores the relationship between the influence of each element on the strategic choices of the three parties, and further analyses the stability of equilibrium points in the three-party game system. The results show that: 1) the setting of the bank's warehouse receipt pledge rate is very important, too high will lead to collusive tendency of B2B platforms, too low will lead to default of enterprises, when it is set to a moderate value banks can reduce their own regulatory costs. 2) the increase of the enterprise's normal production margin will help it tend to comply with the strategy choice, high production costs will make enterprises tend to default strategy choice. 3) the government should strengthen incentives for the application of blockchain distributed ledgers, encourage the application of blockchain technology in warehouse receipt pledges, and reduce the cost of using blockchain.