Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply Chain Finance Receivables Financing for Financial Institutions and SMEs Considering Blockchain

The frequent occurrence of defaults and fraudulent loans in traditional supply chain finance seriously restricts the healthy development of financing businesses. The emergence of blockchain technology has created new opportunities to reduce the risk of enterprise default, improve the financing efficiency of lenders, and create a real and transparent trading environment. This article constructs an evolutionary game model of supply chain finance accounts receivable financing under blockchain technology, incorporating collusion behavior into the default decision-making of SMEs, exploring the evolutionary path of each participant and the stable equilibrium strategy of the model, and considering the impact of cost, punishment intensity and incentive factors on the decision-making of both parties. Using MATLAB software to conduct numerical simulation analysis to verify the deduced conclusions. The results show that there are certain barriers to adopting blockchain technology in the receivables financing model, and the introduction cost is an important factor restricting the application of technology. Reducing costs, increasing punishment intensity and incentives can strengthen the convergence of all participants towards the equilibrium point (access to the blockchain, keeping the promise), helping to achieve a win-win situation for all parties.