About | Contact Us | Register | Login
ProceedingsSeriesJournalsSearchEAI
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering, ICEMME 2022, November 18-20, 2022, Nanjing, China

Research Article

A Model on Information Sharing by Social Responsibility in Supply Chain

Download378 downloads
Cite
BibTeX Plain Text
  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/eai.18-11-2022.2326880,
        author={Yuhui  Li and Yuyun  Zhang and Lu  Lu},
        title={A Model on Information Sharing by Social Responsibility in Supply Chain},
        proceedings={Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering, ICEMME 2022, November 18-20, 2022, Nanjing, China},
        publisher={EAI},
        proceedings_a={ICEMME},
        year={2023},
        month={2},
        keywords={asymmetric information; corporate social responsibility; separation equilibrium},
        doi={10.4108/eai.18-11-2022.2326880}
    }
    
  • Yuhui Li
    Yuyun Zhang
    Lu Lu
    Year: 2023
    A Model on Information Sharing by Social Responsibility in Supply Chain
    ICEMME
    EAI
    DOI: 10.4108/eai.18-11-2022.2326880
Yuhui Li1,*, Yuyun Zhang1, Lu Lu1
  • 1: School of Business Guilin University of Electronic Technology Guilin, China
*Contact email: liyh1981@outlook.com

Abstract

This paper constructs a two-level supply chain decision model involving one manufacturer, one retailer and consumers. The manufacturer owns private information about product quality, and signals it by corporate social responsibility (CSR) behavior. The retailer undertakes CSR with the manufacturer. In order to investigate the role of CSR on signaling quality, and the influence of the retailer’s CSR-sharing behavior, this paper builds an information sharing model. The results show that under certain conditions, the retailer’s CSR-sharing behavior does not have the impact on the manufacturer signals its quality information, and the manufacturer’s CSR level helps to promote the retailer’s investment in CSR. The results provide manufactures’ managers with an implication on choosing an indirect way to share quality information, and disclosing quality information as much as possible.

Keywords
asymmetric information; corporate social responsibility; separation equilibrium
Published
2023-02-15
Publisher
EAI
http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.18-11-2022.2326880
Copyright © 2022–2025 EAI
EBSCOProQuestDBLPDOAJPortico
EAI Logo

About EAI

  • Who We Are
  • Leadership
  • Research Areas
  • Partners
  • Media Center

Community

  • Membership
  • Conference
  • Recognition
  • Sponsor Us

Publish with EAI

  • Publishing
  • Journals
  • Proceedings
  • Books
  • EUDL