Research Article
An Empirical Study on the Existence of Negative Financial Behavior of State-owned Enterprises’ Executives —Based on the Effect Test of Salary Limitation Policy
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/eai.17-6-2022.2322847, author={Wei Yang and Cong Yao and Qinghua Zhang}, title={An Empirical Study on the Existence of Negative Financial Behavior of State-owned Enterprises’ Executives ---Based on the Effect Test of Salary Limitation Policy}, proceedings={Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Economy, Data Modeling and Cloud Computing, ICIDC 2022, 17-19 June 2022, Qingdao, China}, publisher={EAI}, proceedings_a={ICIDC}, year={2022}, month={10}, keywords={negative financial behavior；state-owned enterprise；salary limit}, doi={10.4108/eai.17-6-2022.2322847} }- Wei Yang
Cong Yao
Qinghua Zhang
Year: 2022
An Empirical Study on the Existence of Negative Financial Behavior of State-owned Enterprises’ Executives —Based on the Effect Test of Salary Limitation Policy
ICIDC
EAI
DOI: 10.4108/eai.17-6-2022.2322847
Abstract
This paper aims to study the impact of the salary limitation policy on financial behavior of executives in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Through the empirical analysis made by SPSS of A-share listed companies in the period of 2012-2016, we test the data of SOEs and non-SOEs and found that after the introduction of salary limitation policy, executives in SOEs do have negative financial behavior, which is shown as follows. Compared with non-state-owned enterprises(non-SOEs), the level of financial leverage in SOEs is decreasing year by year, the standard error of quarterly sales revenue is deviating largely, and the on-the-job consumption level of senior executives is improved. The findings help to theoretically enrich the study of the economic consequences of executive remuneration and practically explore the unreasonableness of salary limitation policies, thereby promoting the optimization of the remuneration policies of SOEs in China.