sesa 20(22): e2

Research Article

Controlled BTG: Toward Flexible Emergency Override in Interoperable Medical Systems

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  • @ARTICLE{10.4108/eai.13-7-2018.163213,
        author={Qais Tasali and Christine Sublett and Eugene Y. Vasserman},
        title={Controlled BTG: Toward Flexible Emergency Override in Interoperable Medical Systems},
        journal={EAI Endorsed Transactions on Security and Safety},
        volume={6},
        number={22},
        publisher={EAI},
        journal_a={SESA},
        year={2020},
        month={2},
        keywords={Break the Glass, Access control, Authorization, Medical IoT, CPS, XACML, ALFA},
        doi={10.4108/eai.13-7-2018.163213}
    }
    
  • Qais Tasali
    Christine Sublett
    Eugene Y. Vasserman
    Year: 2020
    Controlled BTG: Toward Flexible Emergency Override in Interoperable Medical Systems
    SESA
    EAI
    DOI: 10.4108/eai.13-7-2018.163213
Qais Tasali1, Christine Sublett2, Eugene Y. Vasserman1,*
  • 1: Department of Computer Science, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506 USA
  • 2: Sublett Consulting, San Mateo, CA 94402 USA
*Contact email: eyv@ksu.edu

Abstract

INTRODUCTION: In medical cyber-physical systems (mCPS), availability must be prioritized over other security properties, making it challenging to craft least-privilege authorization policies which preserve patient safety and confidentiality even during emergency situations. For example, unauthorized access to device(s) connected to a patient or an app controlling these devices could result in patient harm. Previous work has suggested a virtual version of “Break the Glass” (BTG), an analogy to breaking a physical barrier to access a protected emergency resource such as a fire extinguisher or “crash cart”. In healthcare, BTG is used to override access controls and allow for unrestricted access to resources, e.g. Electronic Health Records. After a “BTG event” completes, the actions of all concerned parties are audited to validate the reasons and legitimacy for the override.

OBJECTIVES: Medical BTG has largely been treated as an all-or-nothing scenario: either a means to obtain unrestricted access is provided, or BTG is not supported. We show how to handle BTG natively within the ABAC model, maintaining full compatibility with existing access control frameworks, putting BTG in the policy domain rather than requiring framework modifications. This approach also makes BTG more flexible, allowing for fine-grained facility-specific policies, and even automates auditing in many situations, while maintaining the principle of least-privilege.

METHODS: We do this by constructing a BTG “meta-policy” which works with existing access control policies by explicitly allowing override when requested.

RESULTS: We present a sample BTG policy and formally verify that the resulting combined set of access control policies correctly satisfies the goals of the original policy set and allows expanded access during a BTG event. We show how to use the same verification methods to check new policies, easing the process of crafting least-privilege policies.