3rd Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks

Research Article

Jamming game with incomplete information about the jammer

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2009.8044,
        author={E.  Altman and K.  Avrachenkov and A.  Garnaev},
        title={Jamming game with incomplete information about the jammer},
        proceedings={3rd Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks},
        publisher={ACM},
        proceedings_a={GAMECOMM},
        year={2010},
        month={5},
        keywords={Wireless Networks Power Control Nash Equilibrium Incomplete Information Jamming SINR},
        doi={10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2009.8044}
    }
    
  • E. Altman
    K. Avrachenkov
    A. Garnaev
    Year: 2010
    Jamming game with incomplete information about the jammer
    GAMECOMM
    ICST
    DOI: 10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2009.8044
E. Altman1,*, K. Avrachenkov1,*, A. Garnaev2,*
  • 1: INRIA, Sophia Antipolis 06902 2004, route des Lucioles, France.
  • 2: St Petersburg State University, Universitetskii prospekt 35, Peterhof, Saint Petersburg 198504, Russia.
*Contact email: altman@sophia.inria.fr, k.avrachenkov@sophia.inria.fr, agarnaev@rambler.ru

Abstract

In the present work we deal with the concept of jamming with incomplete information about the jammer. We consider two scenarios. In the first one a jammer could be either present in the environment bringing extra background noise or absent. The user has only statistical knowledge about either presence or absence of the jammer. Namely, the user knows that in the environment only a natural background noise could be with probability γ meanwhile with probability 1 - γ a jammer could come into the action distributing an extra noise of the total power J among the channels. In the second scenario the user does not know exactly the total jamming power. Namely, the user knows that with probability γ it could be J1 and with probability 1 - γ it could be J2. All the problems are modelled as non-zero sum games. The equilibrium strategies are found in closed form.