Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints

Hamidou Tembine; Eitan  Altman; Rachid  ElAzouzi; Yezekael Hayel Hayel

3rd International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools

Research Article

Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints

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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359,
    author={Hamidou Tembine and Eitan  Altman and Rachid  ElAzouzi and Yezekael Hayel Hayel},
    title={Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints},
    proceedings={3rd International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools},
    publisher={ICST},
    proceedings_a={VALUETOOLS},
    year={2010},
    month={5},
    keywords={Population games Markov decision process power control access control.},
    doi={10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359}
}

Hamidou Tembine
Eitan Altman
Rachid ElAzouzi
Yezekael Hayel Hayel
Year: 2010
Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints
VALUETOOLS
ICST
DOI: 10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359

Hamidou Tembine¹, Eitan Altman², Rachid ElAzouzi¹, Yezekael Hayel Hayel¹

1: University of Avignon, 339, chemin des Meinajaries, Agroparc BP 1228, F-84911 AVIGNON Cedex
2: INRIA, MAESTRO Group, 2004 Route des Lucioles, F-06902,Sophia-Antipolis, Cedex

Abstract

This paper studies non-cooperative population games with several individual states and independent Markov process. Each member of each class of the population has (i) its own state (ii) its actions in each state, (iii) an instantaneous reward which depends on its state and the population's profile, (iv) a time-average (coupled) constraints. We apply this model to battery-dependent power control in wireless networks with several types of renewable energies. We show that the game has an equilibrium in stationary strategies under ergodic assumptions and we present a class of evolutionary game dynamics which converge to stationary equilibria.

Keywords: Population games Markov decision process power control access control.

Published: 2010-05-16
Publisher: ICST

: http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359