Research Article
Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359, author={Hamidou Tembine and Eitan Altman and Rachid ElAzouzi and Yezekael Hayel Hayel}, title={Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints}, proceedings={3rd International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools}, publisher={ICST}, proceedings_a={VALUETOOLS}, year={2010}, month={5}, keywords={Population games Markov decision process power control access control.}, doi={10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359} }- Hamidou Tembine
Eitan Altman
Rachid ElAzouzi
Yezekael Hayel Hayel
Year: 2010
Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints
VALUETOOLS
ICST
DOI: 10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359
Abstract
This paper studies non-cooperative population games with several individual states and independent Markov process. Each member of each class of the population has (i) its own state (ii) its actions in each state, (iii) an instantaneous reward which depends on its state and the population's profile, (iv) a time-average (coupled) constraints. We apply this model to battery-dependent power control in wireless networks with several types of renewable energies. We show that the game has an equilibrium in stationary strategies under ergodic assumptions and we present a class of evolutionary game dynamics which converge to stationary equilibria.
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