Markov decision evolutionary games with time average expected fitness criterion

Eitan Altman; Yezekael Hayel; Hamidou Tembine; Rachid ElAzouzi

3rd International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools

Research Article

Markov decision evolutionary games with time average expected fitness criterion

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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4268,
    author={Eitan Altman and Yezekael Hayel and Hamidou Tembine and Rachid ElAzouzi},
    title={Markov decision evolutionary games with time average expected fitness criterion},
    proceedings={3rd International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools},
    publisher={ICST},
    proceedings_a={VALUETOOLS},
    year={2010},
    month={5},
    keywords={Evolutionary stable strategy Markov games.},
    doi={10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4268}
}

Eitan Altman
Yezekael Hayel
Hamidou Tembine
Rachid ElAzouzi
Year: 2010
Markov decision evolutionary games with time average expected fitness criterion
VALUETOOLS
ICST
DOI: 10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4268

Eitan Altman¹^,*, Yezekael Hayel²^,*, Hamidou Tembine²^,*, Rachid ElAzouzi²^,*

1: INRIA, MAESTRO Group 2004 Route des Lucioles F-06902,Sophia-Antipolis Cedex
2: LIA/CERI University of Avignon 339, chemin des Meinajaries Agroparc BP 1228 F-84911 AVIGNON Cedex

*Contact email: Altman@sophia.inria.fr, Yezekael.Hayel@univavignon.fr, Hamidou.Tembine@univavignon.fr, Rachid.Elazouzi@univavignon.fr

Abstract

We present a class of evolutionary games involving large populations that have many pairwise interactions between randomly selected players. The fitness of a player depends not only on the actions chosen in the interaction but also on the individual state of the players. Players stay permanently in the system and participate infinitely often in local interactions with other randomly selected players. The actions taken by a player determine not only the immediate fitness but also the transition probabilities to its next individual state. We define and characterize the Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) for these games and propose a method to compute them.

Keywords: Evolutionary stable strategy Markov games.

Published: 2010-05-16
Publisher: ICST
Modified: 2010-05-16

: http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4268