4th International ICST Conference on Heterogeneous Networking for Quality, Reliability, Security and Robustness

Research Article

Bid-Based Cost Sharing Among Multicast Receivers

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1145/1577222.1577280,
        author={Patrik \O{}sterberg and Tingting Zhang},
        title={Bid-Based Cost Sharing Among Multicast Receivers},
        proceedings={4th International ICST Conference on Heterogeneous Networking for Quality, Reliability, Security and  Robustness},
        publisher={ACM},
        proceedings_a={QSHINE},
        year={2007},
        month={8},
        keywords={Cost Allocation Fairness Multicast Economics Management},
        doi={10.1145/1577222.1577280}
    }
    
  • Patrik Österberg
    Tingting Zhang
    Year: 2007
    Bid-Based Cost Sharing Among Multicast Receivers
    QSHINE
    ACM
    DOI: 10.1145/1577222.1577280
Patrik Österberg1,*, Tingting Zhang2,*
  • 1: Acreo AB, Photonics Box 1053 SE-82412 Hudiksvall, SWEDEN,Mid Sweden University Dpt. of Information Technology and Media SE-85170 Sundsvall, SWEDEN
  • 2: Mid Sweden University Dpt. of Information Technology and Media SE-85170 Sundsvall, SWEDEN
*Contact email: patrik.osterberg@acreo.se, tingting.zhang@miun.se

Abstract

In scenarios where many receivers simultaneously are interested in the same data, multicast transmission is more bandwidth efficient than unicast. The reason is that the receivers of a multicast session share the resources through a common transmission tree. Since the resources are shared between the receivers, it is reasonable that the costs corresponding to these resources should be shared as well. This paper deals with fair cost sharing among multicast receivers, and the work is based upon the assumption that costs should be shared according to the resource usage. However, it is not for certain that an optimally fair cost allocation is most beneficial for the receivers; receivers that cannot cover their fair share of the costs may nevertheless be able to contribute to the cost sharing to some extent. We propose a cost-allocation mechanism that strives to allocate the costs fairly, but gives discount to poor receivers who at least manage to cover the additional cost of providing them with the service.