1st International ICST Workshop on Applications of Private and Anonymous Communications

Research Article

Anonymous return route information for onion based mix-nets

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1145/1461464.1461466,
        author={Yoshifumi Manabe and Tatsuaki Okamoto},
        title={Anonymous return route information for onion based mix-nets},
        proceedings={1st International ICST Workshop on Applications of Private and Anonymous Communications},
        publisher={ACM},
        proceedings_a={AIPACA},
        year={2008},
        month={9},
        keywords={Anonymous communication route information return address mix-nets},
        doi={10.1145/1461464.1461466}
    }
    
  • Yoshifumi Manabe
    Tatsuaki Okamoto
    Year: 2008
    Anonymous return route information for onion based mix-nets
    AIPACA
    ACM
    DOI: 10.1145/1461464.1461466
Yoshifumi Manabe1,*, Tatsuaki Okamoto2,*
  • 1: NTT Communication Science Laboratories NTT Corporation Atsugi, Kanagawa 239-0198 Japan
  • 2: NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories NTT Corporation Musashino, Tokyo 180-8585 Japan
*Contact email: manabe.yoshifumi@lab.ntt.co.jp, okamoto.tatsuaki@lab.ntt.co.jp

Abstract

This paper proposes a return route information encryption scheme for onion-based e-mail systems and mix-nets. Our scheme has the following two properties. (1) It allows any node on the message route to send reply messages to the sender of the message. This property is necessary for sending error replies. (2) It allows the replying node to send multiple reply messages from one piece of return route information. This property is necessary when responding with large amounts of data using multiple messages. In order to construct a return route information scheme, we must consider a new type of attack, namely the replace attack. A malicious node obtains information about the route by replacing secret information that only the node can read. This paper describes the new type of attack and shows that previous schemes are vulnerable to it. Our scheme prevents replace attacks. In addition, we show that by slightly modifying our scheme malicious nodes cannot distinguish whether a message is a forward message or a reply message, thus improving the security of the routing scheme.