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2nd International ICST Conference on Security and Privacy in Comunication Networks

Research Article

In-Band Wormholes and Countermeasures in OLSR Networks

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359551,
        author={Peter  Kruus and Dan Sterne and Richard  Gopaul and Michael  Heyman and Brian  Rivera and Brian Luu and Peter  Budulas and Tommy Johnson and Natalie Ivanic and Geoff  Lawler},
        title={In-Band Wormholes and Countermeasures in OLSR Networks},
        proceedings={2nd International ICST Conference on Security and Privacy in Comunication Networks},
        publisher={IEEE},
        proceedings_a={SECURECOMM},
        year={2007},
        month={5},
        keywords={Computer network security routing mobile communications reachability analysis wormhole.},
        doi={10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359551}
    }
    
  • Peter Kruus
    Dan Sterne
    Richard Gopaul
    Michael Heyman
    Brian Rivera
    Brian Luu
    Peter Budulas
    Tommy Johnson
    Natalie Ivanic
    Geoff Lawler
    Year: 2007
    In-Band Wormholes and Countermeasures in OLSR Networks
    SECURECOMM
    IEEE
    DOI: 10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359551
Peter Kruus1, Dan Sterne1, Richard Gopaul2, Michael Heyman1, Brian Rivera2, Brian Luu1, Peter Budulas2, Tommy Johnson1, Natalie Ivanic2, Geoff Lawler1
  • 1: SPARTA, Inc.
  • 2: U.S. Army Research Laboratory

Abstract

In a wormhole attack, colluding nodes create the illusion that two remote regions of a MANET are directly connected through nodes that appear to be neighbors, but are actually distant from each other. This undermines shortest-path routing calculations, allowing the attacking nodes to attract traffic, which can then be manipulated. Prior research has concentrated on out-of-band wormholes, which covertly connect the purported neighbors via a separate wireline network or RF channel. We present a detailed description of in-band wormholes in OLSR networks. These connect the purported neighbors via covert, multi-hop tunnels. In-band wormholes are an important threat because they do not require specialized hardware and can be launched by any node in the MANET. Moreover, unlike out-of-band wormholes, in-band wormholes consume network capacity, inherently degrading service. We explain the conditions under which an in-band wormhole will collapse and how it can be made collapse resilient. We identify the self-contained and extended forms of in-band wormholes and present wormhole gravitational analysis, a technique for comparing the effect of wormholes on the network. Finally, we identify potential countermeasures for preventing and detecting in-band wormholes based on packet loss rates, packet delays, and topological characteristics, and we describe the results of initial laboratory experiments to assess their effectiveness

Keywords
Computer network security routing mobile communications reachability analysis wormhole.
Published
2007-05-15
Publisher
IEEE
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359551
Copyright © 2006–2025 IEEE
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