1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

Research Article

Strategic reasoning about bundling in swarming systems

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137451,
        author={Daniel Sadoc Menasche and Giovanni  Neglia and Don Towsley and Shlomo Zilberstein},
        title={Strategic reasoning about bundling in swarming systems},
        proceedings={1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks},
  • Daniel Sadoc Menasche
    Giovanni Neglia
    Don Towsley
    Shlomo Zilberstein
    Year: 2009
    Strategic reasoning about bundling in swarming systems
    DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137451
Daniel Sadoc Menasche1,*, Giovanni Neglia2,*, Don Towsley1,*, Shlomo Zilberstein1,*
  • 1: Department of Computer Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA.
  • 2: Maestro Team at INRIA Sophia Antipolis, France.
*Contact email: sadoc@cs.umass.edu, giovanni.neglia@sophia.inria.fr, towsley@cs.umass.edu, shlomo@cs.umass.edu


The objects of study of this paper are swarming systems, a special kind of peer-to-peer systems where users interested in the same content at the same time cooperate with each other. In particular, we consider the problem of how to combine files into bundles in such systems. First, we analyze the case of a monopoly where a single publisher decides how to aggregate its files so as to satisfy user demands while mitigating its serving costs. We establish conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium and how the publisher's bundling strategy affects its profit. Then, we consider the competitive case where bundling decisions of one publisher affect the outcome of other publishers. Using normal form games we analyze the impact of different system parameters on the Nash equilibrium.