1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

Research Article

Queueing game models for differentiated services

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137441,
        author={Parijat Dube and Rahul  Jain},
        title={Queueing game models for differentiated services},
        proceedings={1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks},
  • Parijat Dube
    Rahul Jain
    Year: 2009
    Queueing game models for differentiated services
    DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137441
Parijat Dube1,*, Rahul Jain2,*
  • 1: IBM T.J. Watson Research, Hawthorne, NY, USA.
  • 2: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA.
*Contact email: pdube@us.ibm.com, rahul.jain@usc.edu


We develop a framework to study differentiated services when there are competing network providers. We adopt a multi-class queueing model, where providers post prices for various service classes. Traffic is elastic and users are Quality of Service (QoS)-sensitive, and choose a queue and a class with one of the providers. We model the relationship between capacity, QoS and prices offered by service providers in a competitive network services market. We establish sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibrium in the multi-class queueing game. We also explore characterization of inefficiency in the multi-class queueing game model. The modeling framework we provide can be used to study important properties of the equilibrium solution which may be exploited to provide useful guidelines for performance planning and pricing strategies for firms competing in network resource markets.