1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

Research Article

Spectrum sharing games on the interference channel

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137440,
        author={Mehdi Bennis and Mael  Le Treust and Samson  Lasaulce and Merouane Debbah and Jorma Lilleberg},
        title={Spectrum sharing games on the interference channel},
        proceedings={1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks},
  • Mehdi Bennis
    Mael Le Treust
    Samson Lasaulce
    Merouane Debbah
    Jorma Lilleberg
    Year: 2009
    Spectrum sharing games on the interference channel
    DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137440
Mehdi Bennis1, Mael Le Treust2, Samson Lasaulce2, Merouane Debbah2, Jorma Lilleberg3
  • 1: Centre for Wireless Communications, University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland
  • 2: Alcatel-Lucent Chair in Flexible Radio, SUPELEC, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
  • 3: Nokia, Oulu, Finland


In this paper, we address the problem of spectrum sharing where competitive operators coexist in the same frequency band. First, we model this problem as a strategic non-cooperative game where operators simultaneously share the spectrum according to the Nash equilibrium (N.E). Given a set of channel realizations, several Nash equilibria exist which renders the outcome of the game unpredictable. For this reason, the spectrum sharing problem is reformulated as a Stackelberg game where the first operator is already being deployed and the secondary operator follows next. The Stackelberg equilibrium (S.E) is reached where the best response of the secondary operator is taken into account upon maximizing the primary operator's utility function. Finally, we assess the goodness of the proposed distributed approach by comparing its performance to the centralized approach.