Bidding efficiently in repeated auctions with entry and observation costs

Amir  Danak; Shie  Mannor

1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

Research Article

Bidding efficiently in repeated auctions with entry and observation costs

Cite: BibTeX Plain Text

@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137414,
    author={Amir  Danak and Shie  Mannor},
    title={Bidding efficiently in repeated auctions with entry and observation costs},
    proceedings={1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks},
    publisher={IEEE},
    proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
    year={2009},
    month={6},
    keywords={},
    doi={10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137414}
}

Amir Danak
Shie Mannor
Year: 2009
Bidding efficiently in repeated auctions with entry and observation costs
GAMENETS
IEEE
DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137414

Amir Danak¹^,*, Shie Mannor¹^,*

1: Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, McGill University, 3480 University Street, Montreal, Canada H3A 2A7.

*Contact email: amir.danak@mail.mcgill.ca, shie.mannor@mcgill.ca

Abstract

This paper introduces an efficient bidding strategy for budget-constrained buyers in repeated auctions with entry fees. We present a general algorithm that is applicable to distributed resource allocation. The game is modeled on an economically reasonable assumption according to which any player can participate in an auction after paying for information about the value of the auctioned item, and for the preparation of his bid. We address learning by each bidder of an optimal participation strategy for spending his budget profitably, based on the history of his successes and failures in past transactions. Players' transient and long-term attitudes are illustrated in a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium of a market-based network resource allocation problem.

Published: 2009-06-26
Publisher: IEEE

: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137414