Research Article
Evolutionary dynamics and potential games in non-cooperative routing
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/WIOPT.2007.4480096, author={Eitan Altman and Yezekael Hayel and Hisao Kameda}, title={Evolutionary dynamics and potential games in non-cooperative routing}, proceedings={1st International ICST Workshop on Wireless Networks: Communication, Cooperation and Competition}, publisher={IEEE}, proceedings_a={WNC\^{}3}, year={2008}, month={3}, keywords={Cities and towns Context modeling Convergence Cost function Nash equilibrium Network topology Roads Routing Telecommunication traffic Traffic control}, doi={10.1109/WIOPT.2007.4480096} }- Eitan Altman
Yezekael Hayel
Hisao Kameda
Year: 2008
Evolutionary dynamics and potential games in non-cooperative routing
WNC^3
IEEE
DOI: 10.1109/WIOPT.2007.4480096
Abstract
We consider a routing problem in a network with a general topology. Considering a link cost which is linear in the link flow, we obtain a unique Nash equilibrium and show that the non-cooperative game can be expressed as a potential game. We establish various convergence and stability properties of of the equilibrium related to the routing problem being a potential game. We then consider the routing problem in the framework of a population game and study the evolution of the size of the populations when the replicator dynamics is used.
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