1st International ICST Workshop on Wireless Networks: Communication, Cooperation and Competition

Research Article

Evolutionary dynamics and potential games in non-cooperative routing

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/WIOPT.2007.4480096,
        author={Eitan Altman and Yezekael  Hayel and Hisao Kameda},
        title={Evolutionary dynamics and potential games in non-cooperative routing},
        proceedings={1st International ICST Workshop on Wireless Networks: Communication, Cooperation and Competition},
        publisher={IEEE},
        proceedings_a={WNC\^{}3},
        year={2008},
        month={3},
        keywords={Cities and towns  Context modeling  Convergence  Cost function  Nash equilibrium  Network topology  Roads  Routing  Telecommunication traffic  Traffic control},
        doi={10.1109/WIOPT.2007.4480096}
    }
    
  • Eitan Altman
    Yezekael Hayel
    Hisao Kameda
    Year: 2008
    Evolutionary dynamics and potential games in non-cooperative routing
    WNC^3
    IEEE
    DOI: 10.1109/WIOPT.2007.4480096
Eitan Altman1,*, Yezekael Hayel2,*, Hisao Kameda3,*
  • 1: INRIA Sophia Antipolis 2004, route des Lucioles 06902, Sophia Antipolis, France
  • 2: LIA/University of Avignon 339, chemin des Meinajaries 84911, Avignon, France
  • 3: University of Tsukuba Tsukuba Science City, 305-8573, Japan
*Contact email: eitan.altman@sophia.inria.fr, yezekael.hayel@univ-avignon.fr, kameda@cs.tsukuba.acjp

Abstract

We consider a routing problem in a network with a general topology. Considering a link cost which is linear in the link flow, we obtain a unique Nash equilibrium and show that the non-cooperative game can be expressed as a potential game. We establish various convergence and stability properties of of the equilibrium related to the routing problem being a potential game. We then consider the routing problem in the framework of a population game and study the evolution of the size of the populations when the replicator dynamics is used.