Research Article
DICAS: Detection, Diagnosis and Isolation of Control Attacks in Sensor Networks
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17, author={ I. Khalil and S. Bagchi and C. Nina-Rotaru}, title={DICAS: Detection, Diagnosis and Isolation of Control Attacks in Sensor Networks}, proceedings={1st International ICST Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communication Networks}, publisher={IEEE}, proceedings_a={SECURECOMM}, year={2006}, month={3}, keywords={}, doi={10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17} }- I. Khalil
S. Bagchi
C. Nina-Rotaru
Year: 2006
DICAS: Detection, Diagnosis and Isolation of Control Attacks in Sensor Networks
SECURECOMM
IEEE
DOI: 10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17
Abstract
Sensor networks enable a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains. However, the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these networks expose them to a wide-range of attacks against control traffic (such as wormholes, Sybil attacks, rushing attacks, etc). In this paper we propose a lightweight protocol called DICAS that mitigates these attacks by detecting, diagnosing, and isolating the malicious nodes. DICAS uses as a fundamental building block the ability of a node to oversee its neighboring nodes’ communication. On top of DICAS, we build a secure routing protocol, LSR, which in addition supports multiple node-disjoint paths. We analyze the security guarantees of DICAS and use ns-2 simulations to show its effectiveness against three representative attacks. Overhead analysis is conducted to prove the lightweight nature of DICAS.
