A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game

Quanyan  Zhu; Hamidou Tembine; Tamer  Basar

1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

Research Article

A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game

Cite: BibTeX Plain Text

@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426,
    author={Quanyan  Zhu and Hamidou Tembine and Tamer  Basar},
    title={A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game},
    proceedings={1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks},
    publisher={IEEE},
    proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
    year={2009},
    month={6},
    keywords={},
    doi={10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426}
}

Quanyan Zhu
Hamidou Tembine
Tamer Basar
Year: 2009
A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game
GAMENETS
IEEE
DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426

Quanyan Zhu¹^,*, Hamidou Tembine²^,*, Tamer Basar¹^,*

1: Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and the Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois, USA.
2: LIA/CERI, University of Avignon, France.

*Contact email: zhu31@decision.csl.uiuc.edu, hamidou.tembine@univavignon. fr, tbasarg@decision.csl.uiuc.edu

Abstract

In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access channel game with continuous-variable actions and coupled rate constraints. We characterize Nash equilibria of the game and show that the pure Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient to deviations by coalitions of any size, i.e., they are strong equilibria. We use the concepts of price of anarchy and strong price of anarchy to study the performance of the system. The paper also addresses how to select one specific equilibrium solution using the concepts of normalized equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategies. We examine the long-run behavior of these strategies under several classes of evolutionary game dynamics such as Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, and replicator dynamics.

Published: 2009-06-26
Publisher: IEEE

: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426