Equilibria and convergence of auctions on networks

Peng  Jia; Peter E.  Caines

1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

Research Article

Equilibria and convergence of auctions on networks

Cite: BibTeX Plain Text

@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137410,
    author={Peng  Jia and Peter E.  Caines},
    title={Equilibria and convergence of auctions on networks},
    proceedings={1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks},
    publisher={IEEE},
    proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
    year={2009},
    month={6},
    keywords={},
    doi={10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137410}
}

Peng Jia
Peter E. Caines
Year: 2009
Equilibria and convergence of auctions on networks
GAMENETS
IEEE
DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137410

Peng Jia¹^,*, Peter E. Caines¹^,*

1: Centre for Intelligent Machines (CIM) and the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

*Contact email: fpjia@cim.mcgill.ca, petercg@cim.mcgill.ca

Abstract

First, a quantized progressive second price auction mechanism called UQ-PSP is developed to allocate a divisible resource among arbitrary populations of agents. It is shown that (i) the states (i.e. bid prices and quantities) of the corresponding iterative dynamical auction system converge to a unique quantized (Nash) equilibrium with a common limit price for all agents, and (ii) the dynamics are independent of the initial data. Second, a network based auction is developed where each agent employs a UQ-PSP scheme by observing only their neighbors' bids. The equilibria and convergence properties of this class of distributed auctions are established and are shown to depend on the network topology, and numerical examples are given.

Published: 2009-06-26
Publisher: IEEE

: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137410