8th International Conference on Communications and Networking in China

Research Article

DATA: A Double Auction Based Task Assignment Mechanism in Crowdsourcing Systems

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/ChinaCom.2013.6694586,
        author={Wei Xu and He Huang and Yu-e Sun and Fanzhang Li and Yanqin Zhu and Shukui Zhang},
        title={DATA: A Double Auction Based Task Assignment Mechanism in Crowdsourcing Systems},
        proceedings={8th International Conference on Communications and Networking in China},
        publisher={IEEE},
        proceedings_a={CHINACOM},
        year={2013},
        month={11},
        keywords={double auction truthful task assignment mobile sensing crowdsourcing},
        doi={10.1109/ChinaCom.2013.6694586}
    }
    
  • Wei Xu
    He Huang
    Yu-e Sun
    Fanzhang Li
    Yanqin Zhu
    Shukui Zhang
    Year: 2013
    DATA: A Double Auction Based Task Assignment Mechanism in Crowdsourcing Systems
    CHINACOM
    IEEE
    DOI: 10.1109/ChinaCom.2013.6694586
Wei Xu1, He Huang1, Yu-e Sun1,*, Fanzhang Li1, Yanqin Zhu1, Shukui Zhang1
  • 1: Soochow University
*Contact email: sunye12@suda.edu.cn

Abstract

With the increasing number of smartphone users, mobile phone sensing applications have been regarding as a promising paradigm which makes use of the smartphones to access the ubiquitous environment data. In this work, we study the sensing task auction problem where there are multiple tasks and smartphone users. The most significant challenge of this problem is how to design a truthful auction mechanisms, which is crucial for auction mechanism design. Thus, we address this challenge by propose DATA, a truthful double auction mechanism for sensing task allocation problem. Different from the existing designs, we are the first to design double auction mechanism for mobile phone sensing problem. Besides, we also take the relationship between the utility of task demanders and the number of users that are assigned to do the tasks into consideration, and assign a set of users to a winning demander which can maximize the winning demander's utility. At last, we conduct extensive simulations to study the performances of the proposed auction mechanism, and the simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.