8th International Conference on Communications and Networking in China

Research Article

Optimal Mobile App Advertising Keyword Auction Model with Variable Costs

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/ChinaCom.2013.6694585,
        author={Meng Wang and Zhide Chen and Xu Li and Lei Shao},
        title={Optimal Mobile App Advertising Keyword Auction Model with Variable Costs},
        proceedings={8th International Conference on Communications and Networking in China},
        publisher={IEEE},
        proceedings_a={CHINACOM},
        year={2013},
        month={11},
        keywords={app advertising keyword auctions vcg mechanism gsp mechanism},
        doi={10.1109/ChinaCom.2013.6694585}
    }
    
  • Meng Wang
    Zhide Chen
    Xu Li
    Lei Shao
    Year: 2013
    Optimal Mobile App Advertising Keyword Auction Model with Variable Costs
    CHINACOM
    IEEE
    DOI: 10.1109/ChinaCom.2013.6694585
Meng Wang1,*, Zhide Chen1, Xu Li1, Lei Shao1
  • 1: School of Mathematics and Computer Sciences,Fujian Normal University
*Contact email: 786634498@qq.com

Abstract

With the rapid development of mobile App advertising, how to allocate App advertising more reasonable is now need to be studied. This paper proposes an App advertising auction mechanism based on optimal keyword auctions. First, we analyze the development trend of the App advertising and obtain the result that the core competitiveness of mobile advertising lies in the precise. Next, we describes the App advertising auction mechanism in detail. The advertising click-through rate only depends on the location of the premise and per-click costs. In considering the premise of taking into account the variable costs of App advertising slots, we put forward optimal keyword auctions model. A mathematical analysis is used to get the expected revenues of advertisers, advertising alliance platform and App developers. Finally, we use the expected revenue expressions to analyze the feasibility properties of the model and give the corresponding proof. According to the results of our analysis, we can better guide App advertising and maximum revenue of any equilibrium of this dynamic auction. In order to closer to the actual situation, our model also takes into account the individual rationality, incentive compatibility properties to prove the feasibility of the mechanism.