Research Article
Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/COMSWA.2007.382618, author={ N. Rama Suri and y. Narahar}, title={Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach}, proceedings={2nd International IEEE Conference on Communication System Software and Middleware}, publisher={IEEE}, proceedings_a={COMSWARE}, year={2007}, month={7}, keywords={Ad hoc wireless networks VCG mechanisms broadcast budget balance dAGVA mechanism incentive compatibility rationality selfish nodes}, doi={10.1109/COMSWA.2007.382618} }
- N. Rama Suri
y. Narahar
Year: 2007
Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach
COMSWARE
IEEE
DOI: 10.1109/COMSWA.2007.382618
Abstract
We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We design a Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoc wireless networks. VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the network is required to be bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is not budget balanced. Our proposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these difficulties. We also prove the optimality of the proposed scheme.
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