Research Article
"Token" equilibria in sensor networks with multiple sponsors
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/COLCOM.2005.1651265, author={David A. Miller and Sameer Tilak and Tony Fountain}, title={"Token" equilibria in sensor networks with multiple sponsors}, proceedings={Workshop on Stochasticity in Distributed Systems}, publisher={IEEE}, proceedings_a={STODIS}, year={2006}, month={7}, keywords={Collaboration Contracts Costs Data processing Data security Intelligent networks Nash equilibrium Routing Wireless application protocol Wireless sensor networks}, doi={10.1109/COLCOM.2005.1651265} }- David A. Miller
Sameer Tilak
Tony Fountain
Year: 2006
"Token" equilibria in sensor networks with multiple sponsors
STODIS
ICST
DOI: 10.1109/COLCOM.2005.1651265
Abstract
When two sponsoring organizations, working towards separate goals, can employ wireless sensor networks for a finite period of time, it can be efficiency-enhancing for the sponsors to program their sensors to cooperate. But if each sensor privately knows whether it can provide a favor in any particular period, and the sponsors cannot contract on ex post payments, then no favors are performed in any Nash equilibrium. Allowing the sponsors to contract on ex post payments, we construct equilibria based on the exchange of "tokens" that yield significant cooperation and increase expected sponsor payoffs. Increasing the sponsors' liability is beneficial because it enables them to use more tokens.
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